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The Secularization of Medical Ethics 
By 
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University of Chicago 
Jack W. Provonsha Lectureship 
School of Medicine Alumni Postgraduate Convention 
February 23, 1991 
The American bioethics movement, developed in the 1960s, 
was strongly nurtured by religious concerns and motivations. 
These concerns emphasized personal values and beliefs along 
with religious and cultural traditions. The religious perspective 
emphasized care, competence and compassion, the three Cs 
essential for any adequate health system. Over the past ten or 
twenty years the American bioethics movement has been 
secularized in three distinct assaults on its original religious foun-
dations. The latest assault, driven primarily by economic motiva-
tions and social utility, is surely the most threatening, not just 
to the bioethics movement but to the practice of medicine. I 
will illustrate this by focusing on how our society deals with end-
of-life clinical decisions particularly in light of the Cruzan deci-
sion (end-of-life decisions for incompetent patients). 
My point here is that the process our society employs to make 
decisions for very sick and incompetent patients - our most 
vulnerable patients-will strongly influence decision-making for 
all patients and determine the kind of medicine and medical pro-
fession we have in the future. 
I suggest that 1990 was a watershed year in American 
bioethics. We witnessed two events: the Supreme Court deci-
sion in the Cruzan case and Congress passing a bill called "The 
Patient's Self-Determination Act of 1990:' These will be regarded 
s the highwater mark of patient self determination. From now 
on, I predict, we will see increasing efforts to withdraw decision-
making authority, initially from incompetent patients and their 
families and then from competent patients also. Decision-making 
control will be taken from individuals by several methods, but 
they will have the same goal: to profoundly reduce the strength 
of individuals' personal subjective values and to place enormous 
decision-making authority in the hands of third parties. Not third 
parties, mind you, like family or even physicians, but third par-
ties such as payers, regulators and government. 
My plan then is to examine these two related theses in the 
following way. First, I would like to look at the religious roots 
and origins of the American bioethics movement and to briefly 
note the three secular assaults that have b~en directed against 
traditional bioethics. Those assaults are a value-free philosophical 
tradition, a legalistic tradition, and most recently economics and 
efficiency. 
laside Tilis Issue: 
NORPLANT: BLESSING OR 
DANGEROUS TOOL IN 
THB WRONG HANDSP 
The relationship between medicine and theology has been an 
intimate and even inseparable one going back to the Hippocratic 
Oath and forward into the Christian era. A similar close rela-
tionship existed between theology and the renewed interest in 
contemporary bioethics of the 1960s. First, a tradition of medical 
ethics had been sustained over the past fifty or seventy-five years 
in denominational medical schools and hospitals. Second, many 
of the original teachers of bioethics in the 1960s were chaplains 
or clergy who served as campus ministers in medical schools. 
Many of them shared an interest in influencing the education 
of physicians to make them more sensitive to human values and 
ethics. And finally, most of the early intellectual leaders of the 
American bioethics movement were theologians such as Richard 
McCormick, Joseph Fletcher, Paul Ramsey, James Gustafson. 
Their students included James Childress, Gene Outka, Al 
Johnson and Stanley Hauerwas. Their interest in ethical issues 
in medicine and in human values in medical education was based 
on their spiritual and ethical concerns. 
That first generation of American bioethicists has gradually 
been supplanted or, at the least, heavily complemented by a sec-
ond wave of academics whose primary disciplines have been 
philosophy, law, and more recently, economics and health policy. 
The shift in focus from a theological perspective to this legal, 
philosophical, economic focus is a phenomenon I refer to as the 
secularization of American bioethics. Theological understandings 
of medical ethics emphasized a sense of community and the 
obligations and responsibilities of physicians to individuals and 
the community. It enunciated an ethic of giving and receiving, 
of caring, of helping, and the moral principle-a medical respon-
sibility principle premised on covenantal, interpersonal and com-
munity relationships between physicians and patients and be-
tween the medical profession and society. This was an ethic of 
medicine appropriate to a human relationship between friends 
or colleagues. It emphasized the values and beliefs of the par-
ticipants, both patients and physicians. 
By contrast, the secular movement headed up by philosophers, 
legal scholars and economists, has stressed a legalistic and effi-
ciency model of medical ethics which holds that moral conduct 
is a matter of following rules, and moral relationships consist 
of duties and rights determined by these rules. This model, em-
phasizing social utility, is appropriate to govern interactions of 
strangers and of bureaucratic relationships within institutions and 
organizations. 
I have deep concerns that a legalistic view of medical practice 
is a limiting, inadequate, and undesirable conception. If medicine 
is conceived as a practice of strangers-or even worse, 
estranged-and if it ignores or overrides the values of individuals, 
if it arouses suspicion and distrust on the part of patients and 
doctors, then medicine will be controlled and regulated. Rules 
and laws will be substituted for the kind of trust and confidence 
that previously existed between doctor and patient. Unfortunately, 
this creates a downward spiral in the relationship between 
doctors and patients. Distrust encourages rules and regulations 
which tend to arouse the enmity of the professional and result 
in mutual suspicion and recrimination. It would be more ap-
propriate to bring back to medical ethics the theological perspec-
tive on medicine as a covenantal relationship between doctor 
and patient. This model would supplant legalistic theory with 
a system premised on promise-keeping, indebtedness, justice, 
fidelity, and human responsibility, and would respect individual 
values and preferences. 
I turn now to what I call "The Three Ages of Medicine:' The 
history of the doctor-patient relationship in Western medicine 
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can be divided into three periods. The first period I call "The 
Age of the Doctor:' It lasted from about 500 B.C. to 1965 A.D. 
The second period I call "The Age of the Patient" from 1965 
to October 1, 1983, which some of you may remember is t 
date on which DRGs became the law of the land. The current 
age I call "The Age of the Payer:' Sometimes I call it "The Age 
of Bureaucratic Parsimony:' The key point about the three ages 
is, Who calls the shots? In the first two ages the doctor and the 
patient made the decision. Whatever tension emerged had to 
do with where, within the relationship between the two, ultimate 
power would reside, although this was usually settled by negotia-
tion and accommodation. 
But the third age, I suggest, is different. In this, the age of 
the payer, the decision-making power has begun to shift from 
those who provide care-doctors, hospitals, patients and their 
families-to those who pay for the care. The payers are both 
private and government payers who increasingly demand account-
ability and limit decision choices. In contrast to the first two 
ages, the new system limits decision-making freedom for both 
doctors and patients. It is based increasingly on efficiency and 
economics and social utility, which have emerged rapidly as key 
elements in decision-making. 
Against this backdrop of the history of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, I wish to discuss end-of-life decisions for incompetent 
patients. A case is now unfolding in St. Paul, Minnesota-the 
case of Helga Wanglie, an eighty-seven-year-old woman who has 
been lying in the Hennepin County Hospital in a persistent 
vegetative state since May, 1990. Her physicians recommend 
that the ventilator that keeps her breathing be stopped, but Mrs. 
Wanglie's family, consisting of her husband and two adult sons, 
refuse to authorize stopping the ventilator. 
Why did they refuse? Her husband said that he did it to adher 
to Mrs. Wanglie's strong religious beliefs and her previously ex-
pressed wishes. He is quoted in a court document as saying that 
she told him, "If I cannot speak for myself, don't do anything 
to shorten or take my life:' Now the hospital and doctors are 
planning to go to court to override Mr. Wanglie's expressed wishes 
for his wife on the grounds that Mrs. Wanglie's treatment is futile. 
Decision-making for incompetent patients is a troubling ethical 
problem. In fact, to my mind, it has been the troubling ethical 
problem for the last fifteen or twenty years, at least since the 
Karen Quinlan case of 1976. Incompetent patients include not 
only patients like Mrs. Wanglie, but also patients who, though 
conscious, have severe and irreversible brain impairment such 
as Alzheimer's disease or even congenital mental retardation. 
There are large numbers of such patients. Because these pa-
tients cannot speak for themselves, courts and legislatures, at 
least since 1976, have developed an approach to end-of-life deci-
sions that allows parties - surrogates - to make decisions for the 
incompetent person. 
The underlying assumption that permits surrogate decision-
making in this country is that incompetent patients have a right 
to self-determination similar to that of competent patients. The 
basic rule here is that one employs a substitute-judgment stan-
dard. By substitute judgment, the courts have meant that one 
tries to substitute one's own judgment for what the judgment 
of the now-incompetent would be if the incompetent were able 
to speak for himself or herself. 
There are ways we can discover the incompetent person's judg-
ment. People can write us things in advance such as Living Wil\ 
or other directives. People can talk to us or to their doctors and 
continued on page 6 
· N orplant: Blessing or Dangerous 
Tool In The Wrong Hands? 
By 
Donald R. Tredway, M.D., Ph.D. 
Professor and Section Chief 
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
School of Medicine 
Loma Linda University 
Those of us in reproductive medicine have found Norplant 
a very interesting and useful addition to our armamentarium. 
:-Iowever, we should not single out Norplant, because the sub-
ject we're discussing concerns any contraceptive agent, whether 
IUD or oral. N orplant is one of the few devices that was sub-
jected to large-scale clinical trials before being released in the 
United States. It was conceived in 1966 by the Population Coun-
cil in New York, which explored various possible implant 
methods for contraception. In Chile some of the initial implants, 
made of silicone rubber, were used in 1968. Then in 1974 we 
had the development of early prototypes of levonorgestrel pro-
gesterone in a sylastic-type system. In 1975 a multinational Phase 
III began. This is the final stage before a new product is released 
for public consumption. In 1983 Finland approved the use of 
Norplant, being the first country to do so. This move was 
followed by preintroduction trials in 1984 and 1985 in various 
countries, including Sweden. In the United States, Norplant has 
been released and available only recently, around December, 
1990 to January 1991. 
Norplant is a sylastic capsule which, when placed in the arm 
of the woman, slowly releases progesterone. Similarly, IUDs con-
taining various progesterones have been put into the uterus. 
Norplant contains very effective levels of levonorgestrel com-
pound, which prevents conception for up to five years. It works 
by inhibiting ovulation. It will affect cervical mucus, thus in-
hibiting sperm transport, and there may be additional effects 
upon the endometrium and other systems. The pregnancy rate 
among Norplant users is well below 1 percent. 
What problems are caused by this contraceptive? 
Because we are giving pure progesterone, there will be bleeding 
rregularities and possible headaches. However, statistics show 
that from 75 to 80 percent of users have continued to use it. 
Women should be warned that Norplant will likely cause some 
irregular bleeding: menorrhagia (heavy bleeding) less than 10 
percent; metorrhagia (bleeding between periods) less than 7 per-
cent; always a few cases of amenorrhea (no periods at all). 
Overall, fewer than 20 percent of patients will have some sort 
of problem. Some patients can cope with irregular bleeding, some 
cannot. 
Can N orplant be removed before five years? 
Women often ask, May I change my mind before the five years 
are up and have the Norplant taken out? And what long-range 
effects on fertility does it have? Yes, Norplant can be removed, 
and the patient's body recovers its normal fertility. 
Who are candidates for Norplant? How is it used 
clinically? 
It is ideal for long-term family planning for those who want 
to avoid permanent sterilization. An estimated 25 percent or 
more of women who have permanent sterilization-tubal 
ligations-will want a reversal of that procedure, and the situa-
tion is never as good as it was before, even in the best of hands. 
Norplant is recommended for women who are not candidates 
for IUDs, women who have had trouble with other contracep-
tives, and women who are concerned about taking estrogen. 
(This is a pure progesterone.) 
With the noncompliant patient we get into legal problems. 
Various judges have ruled on the use of Norplant for these pa-
tients. Norplant has been used not only for contraception, but 
also for patients who have had therapeutic abortions and for 
postpartum protection if not breast feeding, or at six weeks if 
the patient is breast feeding and wants to discontinue it. 
What are some of the contraindications for its use? 
Blood clots, active thrombophlebitis or thromboembolic 
disease, bleeding, active liver disease or tumors, and breast 
cancer. However, we use Norplant in some patients where the 
risks of pregnancy outweigh the risks of contraception. Needless 
to say, we would not want to give this drug to a pregnant patient. 
How is Norplant applied? 
This is accomplished in a simple 10-15 minute office pro-
cedure. A trocar will be placed under the skin after the patient 
is adequately anesthetised, usually with a local anesthetic. Then 
the needle is placed under the skin of the upper arm, and a cap-
sule is slid into each of the six arms that fan out from the trocar. 
The arm is bandaged for compression for the first few hours. 
By pressing one end it is possible to see where the implants are. 
To remove them in five years or before, the physician makes a 
small incision in the skin over the ends and pulls them out. 
What are the advantages of N orplant? 
It is highly effective, lasting up to five years. It is convenient 
and easy to use, and does not affect coitus. Upon removal there 
3 
is a rapid return to fertility. Needless to say, once Norplant is 
in, you have a very low annual maintenance cost for this device. 
What are the disadvantages? 
It is a progesterone, and some patients will have minor pro-
gesterone side effects. The major side effect of continuous pro-
gesterone is irregular bleeding, which is a major cause of discon-
tinuance. It does require a minor surgical insertion and removal 
and, of course, a little expense. 
What about the patients who use Norplant? 
Of 80 percent of those who use Norplant, 95 percent are 
satisfied with the method. Over 70 percent want to use it again, 
and 90 percent recommend it to their friends. It is an excellent 
device that has been added to our armamentarium for contracep-
tion. My plea is, let us not allow the legal system to damn this 
important contraceptive device that we have available. • 
Contraception and Coercion: 
Theological Reflections 
By 
David R. Larson, D.Min., Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Christian Ethics 
Faculty of Religion 
Director, Center for Christian Bioethics 
Loma Linda University 
What do dates, acacia tips, olive oil, cedar oil, distillate of cop-
per, ointments of lead, frankincense, and crocodile dung have 
in common? 
Two things at least: All have been ingredients in recipes con-
cocted to prevent conception. And the recipes of which they 
were a part have all been condemned by prominent theologians 
of the Christian heritage. 
For hundreds of years Christian theologians, Catholic and Pro-
testant, condemned these contraceptives not because they were 
ineffective or even dangerous, but because they feared the com-
pounds might actually work. Few things could be morally worse, 
they contended, than for Christian husbands and wives inten-
tionally to prevent offspring that would otherwise issue from their 
sexual encounters. Even the practice of coitus interruptus was con-
demned by Catholic and Protestant thinkers as an unnatural, 
unbiblical, immoral attempt to murder subsequent generations 
before conception. Someone who would kill another human be-
ing without just cause acts wrongly, many reasoned. How much 
worse when a couple severs the great chain of life by preventing 
the conception of children, grandchildren, and so on till the end 
of time! 
One significant source of theological opposition to contracep-
tion was a document entitled The Good of Marriage that Augustine 
of Hippo circulated before he died early in the fifth century. It 
is no exaggeration to say that this essay, written by a formerly 
promiscuous celibate, who is famous for the prayer, "Oh Lord, 
our hearts are restless until they find their rest in Thee;' and 
perhaps not quite as famous for his prayer, "Oh Lord, give me 
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chastity but not yet;' is to this moment the most influential docu-
ment other than the Bible in the history of Western Christian 
sexual thought. In The Good of Marriage, Augustine presents the 
"holy trinity" formula of traditional Christian sexual ethics. Ad 
cording to this, although marriage is spiritually inferior to celibacy, 
it is good in that it (1) produces offspring, (2) fosters fidelity, 
and (3) enables Christians to experience sacramental grace. 
Augustine thought that before the Fall there might have been 
a nonsexual way for human reproduction to occur, even as Jesus 
of Nazareth was conceived without human intercourse. But in 
this world of sin, marriage is good to a certain extent because, 
among other things, it results in the conception of beings who 
eventually become children and adults. 
Although some throughout the centuries opposed the tradi-
tional Christian view that the proper purpose of sexual union 
is procreation, not until the first portion of the twentieth cen-
tury did Protestant theologians in significant numbers look upon 
contraception with moral approval. Their views were prompted 
by improvements in contraceptive measures, worries about the 
exploding population, concern for those whose lives were vir-
tually crushed by the responsibilities of parenting too many 
children, a growing sensitivity to the rights of women, and a 
recovery of a more Hebrew and Islamic understanding of the 
unitive as well as the procreative purpose of sexual intercourse 
in marriage. Official Roman Catholic doctrine has not yet chang-
ed, even though millions of Catholic laypersons use contracep-
tives and thousands of parish priests do not condemn them for 
doing so. One can only hope and pray Roman Catholic leaders 
will see light in making a change that their Protestant brothers 
and sisters in Christ have already made. 
In view of the ethical poverty and perversity of much tradi-
tional Christian thought regarding contraception, it would be eas; 
to dismiss any theological cautions about the use of Norplant 
as yet another instance of predictable moral retardation. I hope 
this will not be the fate of the reservations I wish to express 
about Judge Howard Broadman's decision in California's Tulare 
County. As a condition of eventual parole, he required Darlene 
Johnson, a poor, uneducated and pregnant twenty-seven-year-
old Afro-American single parent of four who has pled guilty to 
child abuse, to accept this recent contraceptive device. My worry 
is not that Norplant is contraceptive, but that in this instance 
the required use of Norplant may be excessively coercive. 
From a Christian point of view, we may describe the moral 
purpose of medicine as the attempt through scientifically sound 
measures to protect, preserve, enrich and enhance the image 
of God in human life without regard to differences in race, gender, 
economic class, personal beliefs, nationality or age. The formal 
image of God in humanity, according to the three Abrahamic 
religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is the greater capacity 
for entering into meaningful relationships with other creatures 
and with the Creator that human persons enjoy, because of their 
greater rational capacities, than do nonhuman animals on planet 
Earth. It is this capacity to be self-aware, self-determining, and 
self-directing, and to be so not in individualistic isolation but 
in intentional and intense companionship with others and with 
the Supreme Other, that the three monotheistic religions call 
the image of God. It is what one of the founders of Loma Linda 
University called the "power to think and to do:' From this 
perspective, a medical intervention is morally praiseworthy to 
the degree that it nurtures the image of God as presentl) 
understood. Conversely a medical intervention is ethically 
troublesome to the degree that it tarnishes or damages the divine 
image in human life. 
The Darlene Johnson case makes me uneasy for at least five 
reasons. First, I fear that Judge Broadman's decision confuses 
the difference that ought to remain between a preventive and 
'\ punitive measure, with the judicial system more responsible 
for punishment than for prevention. This is a relatively minor 
consideration, but one worth noting. Secondly, I fear the deci-
sion unwittingly seduces medicine and health care providers into 
serving as agents of the state instead of advocates for their 
patients. A third apprehension is that such sentences may be 
inflicted more frequently upon the disadvantaged than upon the 
privileged members of the community, even when their crimes 
are similar. This is troublesome from a theological point of view 
that values the image of God in each person without regard to 
the distinctions humans impose upon themselves. A fourth con-
cern is that I do not see a direct connection between Darlene 
Johnson's difficulties with being a successful parent and Norplant 
or any other contraceptive device. If Judge Broadman had re-
quired a drug that would have enabled her to be as calm and 
considerate to her children as most mothers wish to be, I might 
be more easily convinced. By her own admission, Darlene 
Johnson sometimes loses control of her emotions and hurts those 
she loves. The first priority would seem to be to enable her to 
experience greater self-awareness, self-determination, and self-
direction. Norplant is certainly related to this priority, but, it 
seems to me, only indirectly so. Perhaps a psychotherapist could 
be more helpful to her now than a gynecologist. A final con-
sideration is that there is some evidence that neither Darlene 
Johnson nor an appropriate proxy understood precisely what she 
agreed to when she consented to the use of Norplant. If this 
evidence is persuasive, it is damning. To impose a medical in-
tervention upon a competent individual without his or her free 
.nd informed consent, or to impose it upon an incompetent per-
son without the free and informed consent of a competent and 
proper proxy, is to use medicine to decrease rather than to in-
crease the human capacity for self-determination. 
I conclude with a sense of pain for Darlene Johnson and for 
her children. She is not the person she wants to be, I feel cer-
tain. She is not the person we would like her to be either. By 
her own admission, she is a mother who is capable of savagely 
beating her own youngsters with belts and extension cords. When 
dealing with such a vulnerable and sorrowful member of the 
human family, it is easy for us to feel superior and then to be 
overly cute and clever in our judicial and moral responses. I hope 
we find it within ourselves to resist that temptation because it 
is sinister, especially for those who understand the moral pur-
pose of medicine. • 
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A Legal Perspective 
By 
E. Gerrie Schipske, R.N.P., J.D. 
Consultant Faculty, Women's Health Care 
Nurse Practitioner Prpgram 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
Harbor-UCLA 
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded ... than the right of every individual to the 
possession and control of his own person:' - Union 
Pacific Railroad v. Botsford (1891) 
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the 
use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to 
the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage rela-
tionship:' - Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 
"We are two-legged wombs, that's all; sacred vessels, 
ambulatory chalices:' - Margaret Atwood, The Hand-
maid's 10Ie (1986) 
"Women have good reason to rethink their con-
traceptive options. Newly approved Norplant offers 
five years of no-fuss, 99.8 percent reliable protec-
tion:' - US News and World Report (December, 1990) 
Imagine that a California Superior Court Judge orders a woman 
convicted of child abuse to have a birth-control device implanted 
in her upper arm for three years as a condition of her probation. 
Imagine that a Florida County Circuit Court rules that a 
seventeen-year-old, who admits smothering her newborn in the 
process of concealing that she was pregnant, must use birth con-
trol for ten years following her release from prison. 
Consider the scenario of an Arizona Superior Court Judge re-
quiring the lifetime use of contraceptives for a seventeen-year-
old mother of two, who pleads guilty to child neglect charges. 
Or an Indiana Court ordering the sterilization of a thirty-year-
old woman with a history of personality disorders, after she pleads 
guilty to felony child neglect. (Her four-year-old had died due 
to an overdose of psychiatric drugs prescribed for her.) 
Picture an editorial in The Philadelphia Inquirer entitled: "Poverty 
and Norplant-Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass?" 
which proposes that perhaps welfare mothers should be given 
incentives to have a birth-control device-Norplant-surgically 
implanted in their arms. 
Fictional scenarios of judicial eugenics? 
Hardly .. The threat of coerced birth control is neither remote 
nor fictional. It is upon us. The scenes presented above all oc-
curred within the last three years. Not so coincidentally, women 
are also being criminally prosecuted for their behavior and con-
duct during pregnancy and are also being forced in some in-
stances to undergo undesired surgical procedures, such as 
caesarean section and blood transfusion. 
Despite constitutional rulings affirming both the basic "value 
of reproductive autonomy over a majoritarian decision in favor 
of sterilization" and the "right of the individual, married or single, 
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to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into mat-
ters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child;' more and more lower court judges are 
turning to a type of unconventional sentencing which not only 
denies women their right to privacy and control over their own 
bodies, but denies them the equal protection of the Fourteeneth 
Amendment by discriminating against them solely on the basis 
of their ability to bear children. Certainly, there is a "compelling 
state interest" in the prevention of child abuse and neglect. 
However, the state must protect that interest in the least intrusive 
manner. Moreover, it is highly questionable that coerced birth 
control in any way stops an individual from abusing her children. 
Because these judicial rulings are made at the lower level, 
defendants, who are mostly poor, black, and addicted to alcohol 
and/or drugs, rarely challenge the constitutionality of their 
sentences. 
It has been suggested that the resurgence of the government's 
assault upon the womb and the bedroom is attributable to its 
self-perceived impotence in dealing with the problems of poverty, 
child abuse and substance abuse-particularly among women. 
A more feminist view, however, offers that this assault is part 
of a growing backlash by those who feel that women should be 
punished whenever they do not conform to patriarchal 
stereotypes-stereotypes which solely define women in 
reproductive and maternal terms. Although these stereotypes 
were fiercely and somewhat successfully challenged when women 
demanded their right to safe abortion, the fight to control the 
bodies of women who become pregnant and mothers and who 
fail to fit these stereotypes, apparently still rages on in our lower 
courts. 
Inevitably, the constitutionality of coerced birth control will 
be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. In the interim, 
reproductive health providers must ask themselves, how far, if 
at all, are we willing to participate in delivering this form of 
punishment? 
Unlike other medical specialties, reproductive health presents 
such a precarious opportunity to likewise act "paternalistically" 
Siegler - continued from page 2 
say what they want, or they can live a life with a set of values 
and beliefs that can be perceived by a third party. 
There is an alternative standard that most courts have shied 
away from whenever a substitute judgment could be made: the 
best-interest standard. The substitute-judgment standard is a sub-
jective standard. It doesn't say, What would most people want 
in these circumstances? Rather, it says, What would Mrs. Wanglie 
want in these circumstances? based on who Mrs. Wanglie is and 
what her values structure is. 
The best-interest standard is believed to be an objective stan-
dard. Here one presumably doesn't know, or perhaps knows but 
doesn't care, what the subjective values of the individual are and 
imposes some external notion of the person's best interests. Were 
not talking about trivial decisions in these cases; were talking 
about life and death. We're dealing with the discontinuation of 
life support so that someone may die. The best-interest stan-
dard asks, What objective criteria would incline me to discon-
tinue life support in this case? What is important is that these 
be regarded as fair, even-handed, and objective. 
Up until now, courts have shied away from the best-interest 
standard except in instances where the individual's subjective 
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and perhaps "punitively" toward a patient-imposing our own 
personal biases, thereby denying the patient her right to remain 
autonomous. What is so dangerously enticing about the inser-
tion of Norplant in a woman's upper arm is the delusion th(] 
because its placement site makes it easy to verify her compliance, 
somehow it is less intrusive of a woman's privacy than ordering 
her to use other forms of contraception. (And certainly less 
distasteful than checking on the use of a condom by her male 
partner.) 
Assisting in carrying out a court order for compulsory steriliza-
tion or contraception certainly jeopardizes both the "informed-
consent" model of care and the traditional relationship between 
the provider and the patient which is based upon trust and con-
fidentiality. Furthermore, it deprives health-care providers of their 
professional discretion to treat and prescribe on the basis of their 
own evaluation and in accordance with their patient's best 
interests. 
The participation of health-care providers also fails to deal with 
the fact that the court does not and cannot fully understand the 
limitations of medical technology. Norplant is not an appropriate 
contraception for all women. It is contraindicated for women who 
have menstrual disorders, heart problems, acute liver disease, 
diabetes, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, breast cancer, 
or a history of blood clots. It is not effective in women who are 
taking medications for seizures or tuberculosis or who weigh in 
excess of 154 pounds. Its frequently reported side effects of "ner-
vousness, mood changes and depression" hardly make it the con-
traception of choice for a woman who has already demonstrated 
poor coping skills by abusing her children. 
If the real goal of these courts is to stop child abuse and 
neglect, and not to control a woman's reproductive behavior, then 
certainly that should be done without utilizing coercive method 
which both violate these women's constitutional rights and 
threaten the integrity of their relationship with their health-care 
providers .• 
values are unknown. Those instances might be John Doe cases 
brought to an emergency room without known relatives, and ir-
reversibly incompetent. Or they might be persons born with pro-
found mental retardation and never able to express their wishes. 
In cases like these the courts might resort to an objective 
standard. 
As a society we may be making a good game of subjective 
standards - self-determination standards - while moving increas-
ingly and rapidly towards an objective set of standards for 
decision-making. 
I think that 1990 was the high point of the subjective stan-
dard of patient self-determination. First there was Nancy Cruzan, 
a thirty-three-year-old woman who died in December, 1990, 
when her feeding tube was discontinued. Miss Cruzan was 
twenty-five when she suffered a severe head injury in an 
automobile accident, from which she never regained con-
sciousness. She was cared for in a Missouri long-term-care 
hospital where her main form of support was good nursing care 
and food delivered through a gastrostomy tube. After four years 
her parents asked the nursing home to stop Miss Cruzan's feedin 
tube to allow her to die. When the nursing home refused, the 
parents took the case to court. After a series of legal battles, 
the case made its way to the United States Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court's decision stated loudly and clearly that 
physicians should respect the wishes of competent adult patients. 
)
ThiS was the fIrst time a major Federal court had constitutionalized 
he competent patient's right to make his or her own medical 
decisions. By doing that, the Cruzan case provided Federal con-
stitutional validation to the way medical practice had been evolv-
ing for the past thirty or forty years from an earlier emphasis 
on medical paternalism to patient's active participation in mak-
ing personal health-care choices. Seven of the nine judges in-
dicated that the primary issue in such cases should be the pa-
tient's previously expressed wishes or intentions. The majority 
opinion emphasized that a major concern was to insure that the 
integrity and personal character of the now-incompetent patient 
would be respected. Justice Renquist's majority opinion read: 
"The choice between life and death is a deeply personal opinion 
of obvious finality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek 
to safeguard the personal element of this choice through the 
imposition of heightened evidentiary requirements:' But the 
court in Cruzan is searching for that personal element of the 
individual's choice. It was this emphasis on the personal choice 
and personal values of the now-incompetent person that led 
essentially eight of the nine justices to speak out in favor of what 
are known as advance directives. Advance directives are either 
Living Wills or Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care-
both of them health-care proxy arrangements. The key point 
in stressing advance directives was that physicians should discuss 
with competent patients in advance what their wishes might be 
regarding life-sustaining treatment should they become 
incompetent. 
Justice O'Connor was particularly eloquent in stressing the 
value of proxy decision-makers to protect the patient's personal 
;hoice when the patient could not protect himself or herself. 
You see why I think the Cruzan decision was a major event 
in emphasizing patient self-determination, both for competent 
and incompetent patients. 
The other important 1990 event in this area was the Dan-
forth Bill, a curious bill that sneaked through the House and 
Senate in November of 1990 as part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (page 1850 or thereabouts). It was not 
discovered by anybody, not even the American Medical Associa-
tion or the American Hospital Association, for a week or two 
after it was passed. The Danforth Bill provides that upon being 
admitted to a hospital or nursing home, patients must receive 
written information about their state laws and their rights under 
those laws with respect to end-of-life medical treatment. The 
Act also requires institutions, both hospitals and nursing homes, 
to record at the time of admission whether a patient has an ad-
vance directive-either a Living Will or a health-care proxy 
-that would take effect if the patient lost decision-making 
capacity. Finally, the Act requires that when patients are admit-
ted into an institution they must be informed of the institution's 
policies. If these policies conflict with patient wishes and values, 
the patient can choose to go elsewhere. 
All hospitals and nursing homes are expected to be in com-
pliance with the Danforth Act by December 1, 1991. 
Now some of the reasons for the Danforth Bill are clear. It 
provides a mechanism to encourage the use of advance direc-
tives as urged by the Supreme Court in the Cruzan decision. 
Public opinion polls have repeatedly demonstrated that patients 
vant an opportunity to make their wishes known in advance 
while they're still competent to do so. 
Both the Danforth Bill and the Cruzan opinion strongly em-
phasize the value of knowing what a patient's individual beliefs 
and preferences are. Otherwise, why do we bother to get ad-
vance directives from patients? Why would we encourage ad-
vance directives if it were not to try to learn in advance what 
patients would wish when no longer able to speak to their own 
interests? 
The Wanglie case may be but a modest indicator of a chang-
ing attitude in society. Now decision-making authority, so reluc-
tantly given up by doctors after those 2,500 years of medical 
paternalism and so eagerly embraced by patients in that second 
age-the age of the patient-may now be passing from both doc-
tors and patients to third parties. 
There are four ways in which I think patients' right of self-
determination is being limited with respect to end-of-life deci-
sions for the incompetent. 
First, there's a question of whether autonomy is a one-way 
or two-way street. It would be a hollow victory for patient self-
determination if their only right to self-determination was to say, 
Stop the treatment and let me die; and people were denied 
positive rights, as the Wanglie family apparently is, to encourage 
that treatment be maintained. There is a sense that the rights 
that patients so eagerly sought may be limited to the right to 
decline and say No without any commensurate right to say Yes 
for continuation of support. 
A second way in which self-determination is being compro-
mised is by employing the so-called futility standard. Doctors 
in the Wanglie case said that further treatment for Mrs. Wanglie 
would be futile. This seems to be another approach to reassert 
control over patient choices. Some group decides that if there's 
only a 10 or 5 or 3 percent chance of "success" that efforts shall 
be deemed futile. When they're deemed futile no further clinical, 
ethical, or legal obligations would apply to the provider of 
serVIces. 
Who decides what percentage is regarded as futile is an im-
portant question. More importantly, who defines what goals are 
being pursued that have been decided on as futile? In the Wanglie 
case, trying to preserve Mrs. Wanglie's prior wishes, it was the 
preservation of her continued existence that the family regarded 
as a religious conviction on her part that they wish to defend. 
From the doctor's point of view, the goal being pursued was 
the restoration of Mrs. Wanglie's consciousness, which every-
body agreed was not possible given the injuries she sustained 
last May. But by determining which of those goals was the one 
against which the futility standard would be applied was a very 
powerful opportunity to override patient wishes. Here we're 
discussing extreme cases of persistent vegetative state, but one 
could imagine a futility standard being applied in early or 
moderate Alzheimer's disease, severe mental retardation, or in 
other congenital or acquired problems. 
A third way, slightly different from futility, is what I call the 
quality-of-life standard. Here a third party might say, not that 
treatment is futile but that the quality of the patient's life is such 
that treatment is not worthwhile. I'm not referring to an in-
dividual's own choice to refuse further kidney dialysis or cancer 
chemotherapy or some other treatment. That would be a 
straightforward statement of personal preferences. I'm referring 
to a third-party assessment that the quality of somebody else's 
life is such that it's not worth intervening, even though the in-
tervention would achieve the specified goal (the continuation of 
life, for example). 
Finally, a fourth effort to overcome self-determination is ap-
plication of a kind of social utility, social Darwinism, sometimes 
couched in terms of rationing or allocation of scarce resources. 
This begins with the elderly and incompetent, but could rapidly 
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extend to other groups. Former Governor Richard Lamm of 
Colorado has stated that "the elderly have a duty to die and get 
out of the way so the America's industrial engine can be refueled:' 
He swears he didn't say that, but three newspapers and two 
or three television cameras caught him saying it. Not only that, 
but he said it to a Denver church to a group of Gray Panthers, 
so they were listening carefully. But the Lamm notion has been 
said somewhat more carefully by Dan Callahan, Director of the 
Hastings Center, in his 1987 book entitled Setting Limits: 
Medical Goals In An Aging Society. Callahan depicts the elderly 
as "a new social threat" and "a demographic, economic, and 
medical avalanche" that could do great harm. Callahan suggests 
using age as a specific criterion for the allocation and limitation 
of health care by denying life-extending health care as a matter 
of public policy to persons in their late seventies and eighties 
or who have "lived out a natural lifespan:' Callahan wrote in a 
New lOrk Times Op Ed article that "Nothing less than a full 
rethinking of the relationship between medicine and old age will 
resolve the problem of spiraling health costs:' 
My conclusion, then, is that the secularization of bioethics 
has permitted incursions of so-called value-free objective stan-
dards, legalisms and now, new economic and social utility stan-
dards. Instead of religious traditions that emphasize personal 
values and beliefs, we have other traditions affecting our 
bioethical interpretations. What we are witnessing with regard 
to end-of-life decisions for incompetents is a shift from personal 
values to social best-interest standards. We are likely to see these 
standards applied next to end-of-life decisions for competent 
adults, and soon to all patients regardless of the severity of their 
illness or the strength of their preferences or beliefs. Some of 
that has already happened in managed- care situations. That may 
be part of the goal of so-called health outcome studies to decrease 
reliance on subjective preferences and to substitute a social best-
interest test, eventually obviating the need even to hear about 
patient or physician values or preferences. Patients will always 
be encouraged to say No, but who will listen to them when they 
say Yes? Who will hear them when physicians' discretion also 
will be limited by third-party payers, by insurance companies 
and government regulators? 
I think we need a new model of the doctor-patient 
relationship-one that is able to withstand the officiousness, 
bureaucracy, efficiency, and control that is coming rapidly to 
American medicine. There are few defenders of the old model. 
Not even the bioethicists, who themselves usually come from 
the secular traditions of philosophy, law or economics, will pro-
tect us from this brave new world. 
In conclusion, we must do what we can to keep issues of cost 
control separate from so-called death-with-dignity decisions and 
end-of-life care. When the Reagan administration tried to have 
people sign Living Wills at the same time they signed up for their 
Medicare benefits, the AMA Board of Trustees was outraged. 
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"Living Wills;' they said, "should be used for alleviating suffer-
ing and should not be linked to cost-containment objectives:' 
My concerns are reinforced by the coming together of streams 
of medical and ethical opinion along with torrents of governmenr 
concerns about the cost of medical care. I think cost-containment 
strategies already impose significant financial penalties upon pro-
viders who try to offer prolonged care for impaired patients, in-
cluding the elderly. It may prove convenient and all too easy to 
move from recognizing an individual's right to die to a climate 
enforcing what Lamm referred to as a duty to die. I suggest that 
efforts in this field be rechanneled from demonstrating that some 
patients' quality of life is too poor, too meaningless to justify the 
burden of continued life, toward the challenge of finding better 
ways to improve the comfort and care and quality of life for such 
patients. 
The movement for death with dignity arose in response to 
concerns of the public that medicine wasn't paying adequate at-
tention to compassionate caring for patients, particularly dying 
patients. It would be terribly ironic if this latest secular manifesta-
tion served to undercut the image of physician as caring and nur-
turing servant, and to undermine deep human values of caring 
and compassion. The issue is complicated. The tradition of 
medicine is a long one; therefore a slow and cautious approach 
would seem advisable, one that seeks to restore the original 
religious foundations of the American bioethics movement and 
to overcome its secularization .• 
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